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E- Enabling the maximum number of people  
to access essential services will not be possible  
without private sector involvement and appropriate  
pricing of the services concerned
Luc Rigouzzo
Executive President of Amethis Finance and former CEO of Proparco
Abstract. Private sector provision of basic services (water, energy, inancial services and housing) for 
people in developing countries is a necessity if we really want to try to curb poverty. However, ‘traditional’ 
private funding is not spontaneously directed towards these sectors, largely as a result of rejecting the idea 
that poor population groups should ‘pay’ for essential services; an issue that has often been the subject of 
opposition campaigns mounted by social stakeholders. Nevertheless, there are many, many examples to 
show that given the impact of these services on their quality of life, consumers in these countries–and espe-
cially those at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’–are prepared to pay for them as long as they have access to a 
high-quality service. In these sectors, the nominal cost of the service concerned matters much less than its 
opportunity cost and the impact it will have on the lives of those who beneit from it. Very often, this service 
may even be paid for in advance as a way of enabling families to gain greater control over the expenditure 
they can devote to obtaining it.
It is, however, important to distinguish between the supply of essential services and those of consumer goods, 
and–of course–to avoid abuses. In any event, the possibility of building inancially-balanced models is what 
governs the process of securing suficient funding from local and international inancial institutions. In this 
area, as in others, the way forward is probably the happy medium: avoiding the excesses of overpricing, but 
accepting the need to maintain proitable economic models. These should enable investors to receive a level 
of proit that encourages them to continue and increase their investment, thereby increasing the number of 
recipients as quickly as possible. Aspiring to build social models that reject the ambition to achieve a reason-
able proit and rule out any distribution of dividends to shareholders is to condemn the poorest populations 
to long-term dependency on charity or hypothetical budget surpluses, and seriously restrict their access to 
 essential services.
Keywords. Essential services, pricing, bottom of the pyramid, water, energy, microinance, PPP, public- 
private partnerships, cost of risk, risk rating.
Private sector provision of basic services (water, energy, i-
nancial services and housing) for people in the countries of 
the South is a necessity if we really want to try to curb pov-
erty, because neither external funding (development aid) nor 
internal funding (national budgets) are suficient to meet the 
needs of these population groups as deined in the Millennium 
Development Goals. In illustrating its points, this article will 
draw on the experience of Sub-Saharan Africa, because this 
is the continent that faces the greatest challenges: less than 
one person in six has running water in their home, and more 
than 40% have no access to a treated water delivery point. In 
many countries, more than 8 people out of 10 have no access 
to electricity or banking services. Against a background of 
accelerating urbanization, the inability to provide access 
to social housing poses the risk that the majority of the 
continent’s major cities (Sub-Saharan Africa has more cities 
with populations over 1 million than Europe) will be sur-
rounded by enormous shantytowns and all the conlictual 
overtones of such development.
1 The needs of the poorest population groups  
 cannot be funded solely from public sources 
The international community is addressing the Millennium 
Goals by focusing its actions and resources on a series of 
measurable targets to be achieved by 2015 (e.g. to reduce by 
half the proportion of people with no access to safe drinking 
water). Nevertheless, public development aid–generous 
though it is–will not be suficient to provide the resources 
required to achieve these ambitious goals. For example, the 
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annual investment in water supply and wastewater treatment 
required to achieve the Millennium Goals will be approxi-
mately $80 billion, compared with the $100 billion of devel-
opment aid available globally to address every issue.
The following graph, applicable only to the African conti-
nent, illustrates the gap between the need for investment and the 
current level of public funding commitment for key services: 
As in all other economies, it is therefore important that 
these services, which can be proitable, are supplied by the 
private sector within–of course–a regulated framework de-
signed to protect the rights of recipients.
2 However, ‘traditional’ private funding is not  
 spontaneously directed towards the consumer  
 goods and essential services sectors 
• overestimation by many investors of the risks posed by 
investing in these countries
• the judgment that the political risks are too high, or 
that in any event governments have a propensity to 
involve themselves (often on a discretionary basis) in 
these sectors that are–quite rightly–seen as politically 
sensitive (sudden and dramatic changes in pricing 
policy, changes to regulatory frameworks without 
consultation, etc.)
• the dificulty in accepting that poor population groups 
should ‘pay’ for essential services; an issue that has of-
ten been the subject of opposition campaigns mounted 
by social stakeholders
2.1 The irst of these stumbling blocks remains  
a real constraint and, as the following graph 
shows, there persists a considerable gap 
between perception of the risk posed by  
African countries and the reality. 
The fact is that the majority of non-investment grade1 coun-
tries in the world today are in Africa. Those bank practices 
that nearly always rate private risk lower than country risk 
are not appropriate for these regions of the world, where the 
best private counterparties may present a better risk than the 
states in which they are domiciled. But when we look at the 
available data, we can see that doubtful debt rates for larger 
SMEs in Africa are roughly equivalent to those in other 
emerging countries (6.8%, compared with 5.1%). These data 
are conirmed by the low rates of loss reported by the major-
ity of development funding institutions that focus on the pri-
vate sector (SFI, DEG, FMO, Proparco, etc.).
1 Investment grades refer to the bonds issued by lenders, which are 
rated by ratings agencies on a scale from AAA to BBB–(Standard & 
Poor’s scale). These differ from those described as ‘non-investment 
grade’ (also referred to as ‘speculative grade’ or ‘high yield’), which 
are much more risky, but promise a more substantial return (ratings 
from BB+ to D on the Standard & Poor’s scale). Investment grade 
bonds present a low level of risk and are the only bonds that institu-
tional investors may purchase, since the other grades are consid-
ered as excessively risky. (ed.)
In fact, as the graph above shows, there is a considerable 
market gap between the data published by ratings agencies 
and the reality of the situation. So for a ‘Single B’ country like 
Ghana, the ratings agencies estimate that an 8-year loan could 
result in 30% inal losses, whilst the data from inancial insti-
tutions indicate a rate of below 5%. In this instance, the result 
is a gap of 1:6 between the actual risk and the perceived risk.
2.2 On the other hand, after a decade of mixed 
results from Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), 
the stumbling block caused by the perception  
of high political risk is gradually disappearing 
The majority of those involved agree on the urgent need to 
promote effective partnerships between public and private 
stakeholders; partnerships that simultaneously address the 
extent of investment needs, improve project management and 
stimulate long-term local savings.
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) can enable improvement 
in the management of public services and the contribution of 
private capital to public interest projects; they also encourage 
the production of basic services at a cost that makes them ac-
cessible to the greatest number of people. The responsibility 
of the public component is then to guarantee that the general 
interest is met and upheld by focusing on the functions of 
providing impetus, prescription and control, because in the 
end, it is the people themselves who must beneit from the 
new services offered. The role of development funding insti-
tutions should, on the other hand, concentrate on leveraging 
private resources by using the full range of inancial tools 
available in order to enable the emergence of long-term PPPs, 
i.e. partnerships that are economically effective, inancially 
proitable and socially and environmentally equitable.
Having been powerfully imposed on industrial societies, PPPs 
are now becoming increasingly prevalent in emerging and de-
veloping countries. It is however correct that the recent history 
of PPPs has also been peppered by failures that have attracted a 
great deal of media coverage and have tended to conceal the in-
creasing number of successes. Many PPP failures have also re-
sulted from the third stumbling block and central focus of this 
article: the refusal to accept that the poorest populations should 
pay a ‘fair price’ for an essential service is precisely what pre-
vents the introduction of properly balanced contracts between 
the public sector and private  operators. As a result, these private 
operators focus on the ‘richest’ consumer segments (private 
companies, urban middle classes, etc.) and do not seek to serve 
the majority of people in these countries, regardless of the fact 
that they represent a class of solvent consumers.
2.3 There are many, many examples to demonstrate 
that the third stumbling block (requiring  
consumers to pay for essential services)  
is not justiied, and that the private sector  
can be an effective provider of services to  
the poorest populations.
On the other hand, given the impact of these services on their 
quality of life, consumers in these countries are prepared to pay 
for them as long as they have access to a high-quality service.
L. Rigouzzo: Enabling the maximum number of people to access essential services
57www.factsreports.org
 Microinance, the water industry and mobile telephony are 
all good examples of this.
2.3.1 Microinance
The microinance industry was the irst to illustrate this para-
dox. It has rightly been considered as a driver of social prog-
ress over the last 20 years, because it provides access to credit 
and secure savings for population groups with no access to 
banking services. As a result, hundreds of millions of people 
now beneit from these services, which have undeniably 
helped them to stabilize their income and contributed to help-
ing them out of poverty. Nevertheless, this has been achieved 
at a ‘price’–that is to say a ‘cost’–that could have been seen 
as prohibitive, since the majority of institutions charge an-
nual interest rates that luctuate between 25% and 40%; rates 
substantially above those offered to urban dwellers with bank 
accounts in these same countries.
Sadly, this growth in microinance has not prevented bank-
ing penetration on the African continent from remaining at a 
very low rate even today, as the following graph illustrates. 
The banks have not taken the microinance route and have 
not targeted this category of the population for a number of 
reasons, whether regulatory (caps on interest rates), image-
related (no institution wants to be described as a usurer) or a 
lack of understanding of this category of consumer.
2.3.2 PPPs in the water industry 
Despite its long-term proitability, the water industry has par-
adoxically been one of those achieving the greatest number 
of successes. This is particularly true in the case of Africa, 
where the number of privately-managed water supply points 
has grown signiicantly, providing access to water for more 
than 100 million people and substantially reducing water 
losses (in most cases). Nevertheless, in many cases, the price 
of water in rural areas is substantially higher than that charged 
in major cities. We also observe that PPPs are often partner-
ships built with local midsize companies, and that interna-
tional corporate groups no longer have the monopoly.
Lastly, the trend in the types of service provided (produc-
tion, distribution, etc.) is towards diversiication.
PPPs are clearly not a universal panacea, but the example 
of the water industry does show that where political and so-
cial realities are properly addressed and a stable regulatory 
framework is in place, private investment can play a crucial 
role in providing the poorest populations with access to wa-
ter, and more generally, to all essential services.
2.3.3 Although it is probably a less ‘essential’ sector, 
mobile telephony also provides an illustration  
of this problem 
In most countries of the South, the growth in mobile tele-
phony–encouraged and regulated by public authorities–is be-
ing driven by the private sector. The rapid introduction of 
mobile telephony in a very large number of developing coun-
tries is quite remarkable: for example, Africa has seen annual 
growth of above 40% in subscriber numbers over the past 
four years. Achieved in a context where the proportion of 
 income available to pay for these new services seems inevi-
tably limited, this success demonstrates the relevance of the 
model adopted, and in a wider sense, the dynamic nature of 
the African internal market.
Nevertheless, this growth (as with microinance) has not 
been without its negative effects, and the proportion of house-
hold budgets now being spent on mobile phone charges 
(without a corresponding increase in income over the same 
period) is an area of concern. At the same time, some of the 
poorest population groups–especially those in rural areas–are 
persistently excluded from network access.
So many challenges remain. From the operator and user 
points of view, population coverage must be improved and 
service access costs reduced, and this reduction can already 
be seen in the majority of countries.
3 Some lessons and general rules regarding the  
 pricing of services for the poorest populations
3.1 The irst lesson to be learned from microinance 
is that where essential services are concerned, 
the ‘price’ of the service matters less than its 
‘opportunity cost’
In this sector, the nominal cost of the service (the interest rate 
in the example of microinance) matters much less than its 
opportunity cost and the return that the investment will gener-
ate for the lender or recipient of the service. As a result, there 
is no doubt that borrowing at an APR of 40% could be seen as 
extremely prohibitive for a peasant in the Sahel, but not if the 
loan enables him to develop a business whose return on in-
vestment is 5 to 10 times higher (which could be the case with 
livestock farming, small retail shops or craft production, for 
example). It becomes clear fairly quickly that this access to 
inance could enable the borrower to emerge from dependen-
cy relatively quickly and enable him to create and stabilize an 
income. Clearly, this should not be used to justify all abuses of 
the system. Everything therefore depends on the ability to pro-
vide a high-quality service, and in the case of microinance, to 
provide borrowers with the support needed to ensure that their 
investments are compatible with loan charges. Unfortunately, 
there are many examples of such arrangements getting out of 
control around the world. For example, in South Africa, the 
cost of microinance is all the more prohibitive because it has 
long been used as a means of funding direct consumer spend-
ing (on TVs, etc.) or–unfortunately–non-proitable investment 
(e.g. to meet funeral expenses). 
But it is important that we do not fall into the trap of fail-
ing to see the wood for the trees, because the majority of the 
world’s microinance institutions have made it possible for 
their borrowers to improve their lives and gain access to 
proitable work.
In the case of microinance, the high interest rate is due es-
sentially not to high levels of bad debt–which is actually very 
low in microinance and often as low as 1% to 2%–but quite 
simply to the cost involved in distributing large numbers of 
loans each of very small size in areas of low customer densi-
ty. In microinance, it would be fair to assume that in outer 
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urban suburbs and rural areas, the majority of the interest rate 
charge (around 25%) is required simply to cover the cost of 
distributing small loans. The high cost of distributing prod-
ucts and services to the poorest population groups holds true 
for most industries. We see the same type of cost structure in 
the water industry and in consumer retailing. One of the great 
challenges in supplying services to the poorest populations is 
the ability gradually to reduce this distribution cost by in-
creasing the number of recipients as a route to achieving 
economies of scale.
Happily, this increase in volume can be achieved fairly 
quickly, because when services are delivered professionally, 
we see extremely rapid growth rates in these sectors. It is not 
unusual to see microinance customer numbers grow by more 
than 50% year-on-year. The same is true of other ‘bottom of 
the pyramid’ sectors when the service concerned delivers a real 
beneit to consumers. This in turn enables rates, costs and pric-
es to be reduced consistently, made possible by economies of 
scale, and at a later stage by the emergence of competition.
Nevertheless, this should not justify all abuses of the sys-
tem, and there are ways of verifying price ‘fairness’, although 
ultimately it will also be regulated by the market itself.
3.2 Once again, the service may be paid for in 
advance where it can be shown to signiicantly 
improve living conditions and be of high quality.
In the context of microinance, this advance payment was evi-
denced in the irst generations of these institutions by the fact 
that borrowers had irst to accumulate a minimum level of sav-
ings in order to qualify for a loan. ‘Deposits made loans’. In the 
water and energy sectors, South Africa–a powerful laboratory 
for testing models for the supply of services to the poorest 
populations–has clearly demonstrated, with the example of en-
ergy supplies in Khayelitsha township near Cape Town and 
water supplies in Soweto, that populations themselves may re-
quest the ability to access the service on the basis of advance 
payment. This solution allowed families to keep better control 
of the expenditure they were willing to devote to this service.
The project to supply drinking water to the township of 
Soweto is an extremely interesting one from this point of 
view. The project was launched by the city of Johannesburg 
some years ago on the basis that this township with a popula-
tion in excess of 2 million contained communities unable to 
continue paying for water, and was served by distribution 
networks in very poor condition with absolutely colossal lev-
els of leakage and consumption that resulted in serious envi-
ronmental consequences, especially in terms of wastewater, 
which was being discharged untreated in large quantities by 
the township.
The city authority therefore entered into an agreement with 
the communities concerned under which it would write off 
their debts and draw a line under past arrears in return for 
repairing and upgrading the supply network, and installing 
162,000 prepayment water meters. The agreement enabled 
all households to have their water installations upgraded in 
return for payment in advance for the service, which in turn 
enabled the individuals concerned to control their expendi-
ture, as discussed above.
In addition to improving the quality of service for the com-
munities involved in terms both of water quality and quantity, 
the beneicial effects of the project also included a massive 
reduction in water consumption, and therefore in the level of 
liquid efluent discharged from Soweto, thus delivering a sig-
niicant reduction in the township’s environmental footprint. 
It is probable that negotiation of this win-win contract was 
considerably facilitated politically, because the authority it-
self negotiated directly with the communities. It is likely that 
this would have been more dificult in the context of a public-
private partnership contract involving national government.
In any event, the example of Soweto demonstrates once 
again that when consulted, the poorest populations make it 
clear that what they want is access to a high-quality service 
and they are prepared to pay for it. It also demonstrates that 
a local authority can be more politically courageous than a 
national government in managing this type of issue for the 
simple reason that it has direct contact with the communities 
concerned, and is therefore better at identifying their needs 
and political negotiation capabilities. There are many such 
examples, which also highlight the fact that local authorities 
are often better partners than national governments when 
it comes to building effective public-private partnerships, 
since regulation requires direct feedback from the commu-
nities concerned.
4 The ability to build financially-balanced  
 models is essential 
Financial continuity is the determining factor governing the 
long-term funding of investment by local and international 
inancial institutions. When referring to investors, we are not 
talking only of international investors. It is striking to note, 
especially in Africa, that even local investors often overesti-
mate the risk and without additional guarantees are often 
 ultimately reluctant to take it on, even where high-quality 
institutions are involved (‘A Prophet Hath No Honor in His 
Own Country’).
Of the projects I have been involved in funding over recent 
years, two have left particularly strong impressions. The irst 
was in Kenya in 2003, when for the irst time, the French 
Development Agency underwrote a bond issue by Faulu, a 
Kenyan institution offering microinance for women. The 
5-year bond issue was valued at 500 million Kenyan 
Shillings–equivalent to around €5 million–and was the irst 
to give an African microinance institution access to the 
 market (the Nairobi stock exchange in this case). A quarter of 
the risk was taken by investors, with the remaining three 
quarters underwritten by the French Development Agency.
The deal resulted in micro-loans being advanced to 
24,000 women. At the time of the issue, Faulu was already a 
relatively mature microinance institution with a very high 
proile in Kenya. As such, an issue of this type in another 
market would not have required external guarantees. It would 
have required only a straightforward direct market issue by 
Faulu or a loan from a local bank. But this irst deal required 
a guarantee underwritten by an external backer. Such a guar-
antee was only given because Faulu had in place a balanced 
inancial model and could demonstrate its ability to repay. 
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It is interesting to note that since this irst deal, Faulu has 
made further bond issues via the Nairobi market with no ex-
ternal guarantee, and that the market now recognizes that this 
institution is capable of direct borrowing on its own account. 
Once again, this is possible only because it is inancially 
well-balanced.
The second example is that of Eduloan in South Africa. 
This microinance institution provides loans to enable black 
students to attend South African universities, most of which 
are privately run. Eduloan entered into an agreement with 
these universities under the terms of which it advances loans 
to students at relatively low rates of interest to cover the cost 
of their university entrance and education. Once again, the 
irst time that this institution wanted to borrow extensively 
from a local bank, it was not able to do so without a guarantee 
underwritten by an external backer, since local banks saw the 
proposition as high risk, quite simply because they had very 
little knowledge of either the sector or the institution.
It is also instructive to note that the learning curve was ex-
tremely steep, since the bank that had agreed to lend against 
a guarantee provided by an external backer decided only two 
years later to take a direct stake in Eduloan, demonstrating 
that by this time it was fully aware not only that the proposi-
tion was a good risk, but also that as an institution it had the 
potential to deliver a suficient return on capital to be attrac-
tive to a private bank.
It is thanks to this type of transaction that Eduloan has 
been able to provide hundreds of thousands of South African 
 students with access to further education. Once again, this 
would not have been possible without the commitment of 
 local capital, and that commitment could not have been 
 obtained without appropriate pricing.
Lastly, this same type of reasoning also applies to much 
larger investments, and I can think of a third example involv-
ing energy supplies in Uganda. In Uganda, 90% of the popula-
tion has no access to electricity. On average, Ugandans use 
200 times less energy than Europeans. What’s more, the elec-
tricity that is available is relatively expensive, because the 
current alternatives are essentially thermal power, given that 
the existing plants have reached saturation point. The Bujagali 
project aims to double power generation in Uganda by means 
of a run-of-river hydro dam. The project represents a very 
high level of investment at around $700 million to $800 mil-
lion, but since the energy generated will be hydroelectric pow-
er, its cost will be very competitive. It will double the  country’s 
power-generating capacity, and therefore provide hundreds of 
thousands of people with electricity, at the same time as reduc-
ing the cost of energy by using a cleaner and greener method 
of generation, because hydroelectric plants make a positive 
contribution to containing climate change. A concession con-
tract was signed between the Ugandan government and the 
Aga Khan Group, enabling this private equity investor to be-
come involved with the support of backers.
In this example, the private operator, the investor, should 
ultimately receive a comfortable return on its capital, and in 
any event, one that justiies the risk accepted in making the 
investment. That said, once again the end-consumer should 
eventually beneit from substantially cheaper energy costs in 
Uganda, making this a win-win arrangement. But this model 
could not exist, the $800 million could not have been raised 
and energy prices could not have been lowered for consumers 
without a context in which the ultimate recipient pays for the 
electricity. Naturally, this payment does not necessarily in-
volve uniform and/or unfair payments. As in the water indus-
try, the energy industry may also make use of social pricing 
structures with payment levels differentiated on the basis of 
consumer categories, under which large companies and gov-
ernment institutions pay more than private individuals and 
very small consumers, because the operator has negotiated an 
average tariff that enables these different categories of cus-
tomer to be aligned and balanced in certain ways.
5 It is, however, important to distinguish  
 between the supply of essential services  
 and that of consumer goods, and–of course– 
 to avoid abuses
This argument in favor of the need to price essential services 
in such a way as to enable access to them by the maximum 
number of people does not apply strictly in the same way to 
consumer goods, and the entire ‘bottom of the pyramid’ de-
bate of recent years has sometimes mixed up and confused 
essential services with consumer goods.
This is not to say that there is no justiication for trying to 
price a pot of yoghurt, a pair of glasses or a light bulb cor-
rectly, but it is one of the most archetypal market conundrums 
within which a manufacturer faces three challenges in terms 
of consumer goods: (i) adapting its products to meet the 
needs of speciic consumer groups (in this case, the poor), 
(ii) enabling customer access by adapting its distribution 
 network, and (iii) adapting its prices (affordability).
The issue of arriving at a fair price for consumer goods 
must certainly address the same concern as essential servic-
es, which is to absorb the additional distribution costs in-
volved in distributing small and limited unit quantities to the 
maximum number of customers. Cost of distribution there-
fore remains the paradigm and principal challenge common 
to essential services and consumer goods.
But essential services deliver a much higher return on in-
vestment for the poorest populations. Access to high-quality 
drinking water simultaneously reduces the frequency of ill-
ness, enables improved human development, and is therefore 
an extremely proitable service for the recipient. As we have 
seen, where access to a inancial service enables investment 
and–thereby–to gainful employment, this too is extremely 
proitable. All the research suggests that the same is true of 
energy, but less true for some consumer goods, which deliver 
fewer and less important beneits. 
It is therefore important to make a distinction between 
these two broad categories (essential services versus consum-
er goods), and–paradoxically–it may be justiied to require 
rural consumers to pay more for essential services, for ex-
ample, than urban consumers, given the importance of these 
services for the wellbeing of the communities concerned and 
their ability to self-regulate their consumption of services.
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6 Conclusion
Aspiring to build social models that reject the ambition to 
achieve a reasonable proit and rule out any distribution of 
dividends to shareholders is to condemn the poorest popu-
lations to long-term dependency on charity and seriously 
 restrict their access to essential services.
It is quite paradoxical to ind that the microinance indus-
try, which was one of the irst to demonstrate the justiication 
behind charging for services to poor population groups, is 
now lobbying in favor of ruling out any distribution of divi-
dends by social businesses.
As generous and understandable as this approach is, we 
must unfortunately accept the fear that this ‘well-meaning’ 
viewpoint will once again reduce future investment in these 
services, and will ensure that entire categories of the popula-
tion remain without access to them and continue to live in the 
very conditions of poverty that those who defend social busi-
ness wish to avoid. In this area, as in others, the way forward 
is probably the happy medium: avoiding the excesses of 
overpricing and excessive proits, but accepting–from our 
point of view–the need to maintain business models that are 
proitable business models. These should enable investors in 
these sectors to receive a level of proit that encourages them 
to continue and increase their investment, thereby increasing 
the number of recipients as quickly as possible. Making the 
opposite choice can lead only to a Malthusian mindset, which, 
by ruling out the distribution of dividends and removing prof-
it, will result in limiting investment and–ultimately–in limit-
ing the rate at which the poorest populations can extricate 
themselves from isolation and poverty.
